

# Incident Response and Forensics

## Overview and challenges



**CIRCL**

Computer Incident  
Response Center  
Luxembourg

CIRCL - *TLP:WHITE*

[info@circl.lu](mailto:info@circl.lu)


2019-10-17

# CERT History

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- Morris worm / Internet worm
  - 2. November 1988
  - Robert Tappan Morris
  - Exploiting: Finger, Sendmail, Passwords
  - Intention: Measure size of the Internet
  - Program bug → Denial of Service
  - Result: Internet down
- Mitigation challenges
  - Analyze malware
  - Identify vulnerabilities
  - Advisories
  - Provide/Get information
  - Point of contact
- Computer Emergency Response Team
  - Carnegie Mellon University

# CERT.LU



Luxembourg CERT Landscape



**CIRCL**

Computer Incident  
Response Center  
Luxembourg

- The Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg (CIRCL) is a government-driven initiative designed to provide a systematic response facility to computer security threats and incidents.
- CIRCL is the CERT for the private sector, communes and non-governmental entities in Luxembourg.
- Visit <https://www.circl.lu/> for projects and services

# Proactive security & Incident detection

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- Paste monitoring:

```
...
http://migXXXXX.lt/index.php?cPath=999999.9 union all select [t]
http://www.XXXX.lu/index.php?cat=999999.9 union all select 1,[t],3--&page=16&lang=fr
http://www.XXXX.lv/?id_p=news_al&id=999999.9 union all select 1,[t],3,4,5
http://XXXXXXXX.org/view_cat.php?%20cat=999999.9 union all select [t],2
http://www.XXXX.mu/info/?id=13' and [t] and '1'='1
...
```

- Leak Detection:

```
...
pascal.XXXX@club-internet.XX:tp100b
XXybakXXXXX@sbXXXXXX.net:sr15926
arbaXXXXXXXX@XXXenet.XX:x-men1
angelbroXXX@XXXX.net:asb1061
atXXXXXXXX75@hotmail.com:chelatinia
XXXXXXXXXXXX@mil.be:hitler
adamgXXXXXX@yahoo.com:122179
michaeXXXXt@hotmail.com:misslittle
adamXXXXXXXX@XXXXX.XX:aczcover
naseemXXXXX@gmail.com:doctor
jspaccarXXX@ciXXXXi.XX:raleigh1
edytXXXXXXXX@02.pl:edyta71
...
```

# Proactive security & Incident detection

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- Reports and Advisories:

## TR-54 - Sextortion scam emails - I know your password

### Overview

During the past few days, we have received an increasing number of reports about scam attempts.

Usually the malicious emails involved in the scam start with sentences such as **I know that XYZ is your password**, with the scary part being that XYZ is in fact a real password of the targeted user.

In one example, as displayed below, the attacker explains that they compromised the victim's PC by infecting it with a remote access malware. They also state that they have activated the webcam of the PC and recorded a video clip of the victim.

The attackers claim that the victim is required to pay a ransom in Bitcoins in order to get the movie destroyed - refusing to do so would lead to the attackers spreading the movie to all of the contacts of the victim.

While these kind of sextortion scams are rather old, the quality of these recent occurrences has raised the bar massively, due to the fact that the attackers seem to possess and threaten with a real password of the victim.

### TR-54 - Sextortion scam emails - I know your password

[1 Back to Publications and Presentations](#)

[Overview](#)

[One explanation](#)

[Scam example](#)

[Email sent from own account](#)

[Shortened example](#)

[Fixing, re-mediation and mitigation](#)

[References](#)

[Classification](#)

# Report an incident

## CIRCL - Contact

### Postal address

CIRCL - Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg  
c/o "security made in Lëtzebuerg" (SMILE) g.i.e.  
16, bd d'Avranches  
L-1160 Luxembourg  
Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg

### Telephone

(+352) 247 88444

### E-mail (ticketing system)

info@circl.lu

GPG fingerprint: CA57 2205 C002 4E06 BA70 BE89 EAAD CFFC 22BD 4CD5

### CIRCL - Contact

Postal address

Telephone

E-mail (ticketing system)


You can report incidents via our official contact including e-mail, phone or use the Anonymous reporting form.

Search



## Statistics: Incidents per year

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# Forensic Analysis

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- Post-mortem Analysis

  - <https://www.circl.lu/pub/tr-22/>

  - <https://www.circl.lu/pub/tr-30/>

- Memory Forensics

  - <https://www.circl.lu/pub/tr-22/>

  - <https://www.circl.lu/pub/tr-30/>

- Network Forensics

- Reverse Engineering

- Code-Deobfuscation

- Mobile Forensics

- Cloud Forensics

## Exercise: Data Exfiltration

---

- USB Key: Are there data hidden?
  - Windows Explorer
  - Show hidden files
  - CMD: `dir`
  - Open the file
  - 
  - Other ideas?

- Answers:

>  
>  
>  
>

- Creating xxx:

>  
>  
>  
>

# Exercise: Data Exfiltration

---

- USB Key: Are there data hidden?
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  - Show hidden files
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  - Open the file
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  - Other ideas?

- Answers:

```
> dir /r          # Windows Vista +
>
> notepad H:\test.txt:123.txt
> mspaint H:\text.txt:123.png
```

- Creating ADS:

```
> File name syntax: <filename.ext>:<stream-name.ext>
>
> type F:\123.txt >> H:\test.txt:123.txt
> type F:\123.png >> H:\test.txt:123.jpg
```

# Exercise: Hide data outside the partition

---

- Investigate disk layout

```
# fdisk -l /dev/sda
Disk /dev/sda: 7,6 GiB, 8178892800 bytes, 15974400 sectors
Units: sectors of 1 * 512 = 512 bytes

   Device   Boot Start      End  Sectors  Size Id Type
/dev/sda1             2048 526335   524288   256M  7 HPFS/NTFS/exFAT
```

- Hide a text message

```
#
-
```

- Hide a binary

```
#
-
```

- Access hidden data

```
#
#
```

# Exercise: Hide data outside the partition

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```

- Hide a text message

```
# echo -n "MySecret_123456" | dd of=/dev/sda seek=100
15 bytes copied, 0,00227001 s, 6,6 kB/s
```

- Hide a binary

```
# dd if=/bin/dd of=/dev/sda seek=101
76000 bytes (76 kB, 74 KiB) copied, 0,0344384 s, 2,2 MB/s
```

- Access hidden data

```
#
```

```
#
```

# Exercise: Hide data outside the partition

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```

- Access hidden data

```
# dd if=/dev/sda bs=512 skip=100 count=1 | xxd | less
# dd if=/dev/sda bs=1 skip=$((512*101)) count=76000 of=dd.exe
```

## Demo: Modify data on RO mounted device

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- Message in a forensic book
  - *"Nothing will prevent your Linux system to modify data on a read only mounted device"*
- Leads to a new exercise for CIRCL DFIR 1.0.1 training
- I will
  - Targeted tamper of evidences
  - Only use Linux on-board-tools
  - Be root
  - Cheat (A little bit)
- I will not
  - Remount in RW mode
- Any ideas?

# Demo: Modify data on RO mounted device

---

```
mount
mount -o ro,remount /dev/sda1 /media/michael/CIRCL_DFIR/
mount
```

Demo: Modify Document

```
strings -td /dev/sda1 | grep "World"
.....
82434 Hello World!
.....

echo $((82434/512))
161

dd if=/dev/sda1 bs=512 skip=161 count=1 of=161.raw
ll
hexer 161.raw

dd if=161.raw bs=512 seek=161 count=1 of=/dev/sda1
mount
```

Demo: Review Document